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Using Building Codes to Rewrite the 




In 2007, in Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection 
Agency (Mass. v. EPA),1 the Supreme Court ruled that the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had authority under the 
Clean Air Act (CAA) to regulate emissions of greenhouse gases 
(GHGs), which include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, 
and fluorinated gases.2  GHGs trap excess heat in the atmosphere 
and cause climate change.3  On December 7, 2009, the EPA 
Administrator found that GHGs “may reasonably be anticipated 
to endanger public health or welfare” due to their contribution to 
climate change, triggering EPA regulation of GHG emissions 
from cars and trucks (mobile sources) under the CAA.4 
The EPA’s endangerment finding also requires the EPA to 
regulate GHGs from stationary sources under the CAA.5  
Stationary sources are defined in the CAA as “any building, 
 
        *The author  would like to thank everyone who read this paper and gave 
their comments, including Douglas Kysar (Yale Law School), Michael Livermore 
(NYU School of Law), Michael Lewyn (Touro Law Center), and Victor Flatt 
(University of North Carolina School of Law). 
 1. 549 U.S. 497, 498 (2007). 
 2. Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Greenhouse Gases Overview, EPA, 
http://epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/gases.html (last updated Aug. 31, 
2012). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Endangerment Findings for GHGs, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496, 66,505 (Dec. 15, 
2009). 
 5. See discussion infra Part II. 
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structure, facility, or installation which emits or may emit any air 
pollutant.”6  The CAA states that any new or existing stationary 
source that emits more than either 100 or 250 tons per year (tpy) 
of regulated pollutants requires a permit.7  Millions of stationary 
sources, mostly buildings, emit more than 100 tpy of carbon 
dioxide.8 
According to the EPA, the plain language of the CAA would 
cause six million stationary sources (mostly commercial and 
residential buildings) to need operating permits.9  Currently, only 
about 15,000 sources already have operating permits for other 
types of air pollution under the CAA.10  In the EPA’s estimation, 
requiring permits from six million stationary sources would cost 
permitting authorities (federal and state governments) $22.5 
billion annually, instead of the $105 million cost of requiring 
permits from only the largest polluters, similar to current 
practice.11  Most single family houses would be exempt from CAA 
regulation of GHG emissions; a typical household only emits 
about 13.5 tpy of carbon dioxide, measured in carbon dioxide 
equivalent (CO2e).12  However, larger buildings for commercial, 
industrial, and residential use would be regulated and therefore 
require permits. 
The Obama Administration promulgated the Tailoring Rule 
in June 2010 to greatly reduce the cost to permitting agencies and 
 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(3) (2006). 
 7. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2006) (Prevention of Significant Deterioration); 
see also 42 U.S.C. § 7661 (2006) (Title V). 
 8. EPA, Final Rule: Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V 
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule: Fact Sheet, 1 (May 13, 2010), 
http://www.epa.gov/nsr/documents/20100413fs.pdf. 
 9. EPA, Operating Permits Burden Reductions With and Without the 
Tailoring Rule (May 13, 2010), http://www.epa.gov/NSR/documents/ 
20100413piecharts.pdf [hereinafter Operating Permits Burden]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Household Emissions Calculator Assumptions and References, EPA, 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/ind-assumptions.html (last 
visited Oct. 29, 2012).  Methane, nitrous oxide, and fluoridated gases are more 
powerful greenhouse gases than carbon dioxide.  Greenhouse gas emissions are 
measured in terms of total climate change potential, otherwise known as units 
of carbon dioxide (hence carbon dioxide equivalent). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/2
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the number of permits required.13  The Tailoring Rule limits 
regulation of GHG emissions from stationary sources to sources 
that emit at least 100,000 tpy CO2e, or emit at least 100,000 tpy 
CO2e and undertake a modification that increases GHG emissions 
by at least 75,000 tpy CO2e.14 
Industry groups and states opposed to the Tailoring Rule 
filed suit against the EPA to get the Tailoring Rule vacated.  
These cases were consolidated in the D.C. Circuit under Coalition 
for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA.15  The D.C. Circuit did 
not evaluate the lawfulness of the Tailoring Rule on the merits; 
instead, the court stated that none of the petitioners had standing 
because the Tailoring Rule would help them, not harm them, by 
reducing the cost of complying with the CAA.16  Therefore, the 
petitioners suffered no injury-in-fact and did not have standing to 
challenge the Tailoring Rule.17 
The combination of Mass. v. EPA and the CAA gives the EPA 
three plausible paths to regulate GHG emissions from buildings.  
The EPA can: 
(1)   follow the plain language of the CAA and require 
millions of buildings (and other sources of GHG 
emissions) to get individualized permits–costing 
permitting agencies $22.5 billion;18 
(2)   regulate fewer buildings on an individualized basis–the 
Tailoring Rule does this and only costs permitting 
agencies $105 million, instead of $22.5 billion.19  
However, the Tailoring Rule leaves millions of 
buildings unregulated that the CAA and Mass. v. EPA 
imply should be regulated.  The EPA instead could: 
(3)   regulate millions of buildings on a general (not 
individualized) basis, issuing regulations for certain 
types of buildings, rather than for each individual 
building. 
 
 13. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010). 
 14. Id.; see also discussion infra Part III.a. 
 15. 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 16. Id. at 146. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Operating Permits Burden, supra note 9.   
 19. Id. 
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In this paper, I propose that the EPA regulate buildings emitting 
more than 100 or 250 tpy CO2e by forcing states to enact more 
energy-efficient building codes for those buildings. 
Furthermore, in this paper I show that my proposal is legally 
sound while the Tailoring Rule is legally suspect.  In general, 
federal courts force administrative agencies to regulate all 
entities that congressional statutes state they must regulate.  
This suggests that the EPA cannot refuse to regulate buildings 
that emit more than 100 or 250, and less than 100,000, tpy CO2e 
as the EPA does in its Tailoring Rule.  Instead, the EPA should 
forego the case-by-case regulatory approach normally mandated 
in the CAA for a more manageable approach that regulates all 
mandated buildings, but does so through more energy-efficient 
building codes. 
Using building codes to regulate buildings is also good policy.  
The savings from better building design; heating, ventilation, and 
cooling systems (HVAC); and insulation usually pay for 
themselves in energy savings.  Market failures, especially for 
buildings that are not owner-occupied, cause buildings to expend 
more energy than they would in an efficient market. 
Part II describes regulation of GHG emissions under the 
CAA.  Part III discusses why the Tailoring Rule is legally suspect.  
Part IV describes the legal implications of using building codes to 
regulate GHG emissions under the CAA.  Part V shows why 
using building codes to regulate GHG emissions is good policy.  
Part VI concludes. 
II. THE CLEAN AIR ACT 
Mass. v. EPA and the language of the CAA forced the EPA to 
regulate GHG emissions.  Under the CAA, an “air pollutant” is 
defined as “any air pollution agent . . . which is emitted into . . . 
the ambient air.”20  In Mass. v. EPA, the Supreme Court declared 
that GHGs, including carbon dioxide, were air pollutants under 
the CAA.21  Under the CAA, the EPA is required to regulate 
emissions of any “air pollutant” which in the “judgment” of the 
 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006). 
 21. 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/2
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EPA Administrator “cause, or contribute to, air pollution which 
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or 
welfare.”22  After Mass. v. EPA and years of studies detailing the 
potential harms of climate change, it was clear that the EPA 
would have to find that GHG emissions “endanger[] public health 
or welfare.”23  In 2009, the EPA made its endangerment finding 
and GHG emissions came under CAA regulation.24 
The EPA’s endangerment finding triggered several types of 
CAA regulation: 
● New Source Performance Standards (NSPS); 
● Performance standards for existing sources; 
● Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD); and 
● Title V permitting requirements. 
I describe each of these in turn. 
NSPS for stationary sources are mandated in section 111 of 
the CAA.25  NSPS are EPA-imposed emission control 
requirements.  Under this section, the EPA imposes emission 
control requirements for categories of emitters that “cause[], or 
contribute[] significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably 
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”26  NSPS are 
the best demonstrated technology for reducing emission from that 
category of sources, taking into account the costs of imposing such 
 
 22. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006) (mobile sources); 42 U.S.C. § 
7411(b)(1)(A) (2006) (stationary sources, including buildings). 
 23. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), IPCC 
FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT: CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 (2007) (detailing how GHG 
emissions endanger public health and welfare); see also Letter from Lisa P. 
Jackson, Adm’r, EPA, to Jay Rockefeller, U.S. Senator (Feb. 22, 2010) (“As a 
result of the Court’s decision, EPA became obligated to treat greenhouse-gas 
emissions as air pollution under the Clean Air Act and to engage with the best 
available science in determining whether those emission endanger Americans’ 
health or welfare.”). 
 24. Endangerment Findings for GHGs, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Dec. 15, 2009) 
(final rule). 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006).  Note that these provisions apply to GHGs 
because there is no National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for GHGs.  
If the EPA were to classify GHGs as criteria pollutants, then 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409, 
7410 (2006) would apply instead. 
 26. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A). 
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controls.27  These controls must be adopted by new and modified 
sources in the relevant categories.28 
Recently, the EPA promulgated proposed GHG emissions 
standards for new power plants.29  The power plant NSPS for 
GHGs is such that natural gas power plants can meet the 
standard, but new coal plants cannot without carbon capture and 
storage.30 
Section 111 also requires the EPA to issue guidelines to 
states for the creation of standards for existing sources for which 
NSPS have been promulgated.31  States then must develop the 
equivalent of State Implementation Plans (SIPs) which establish 
and impose emission standards for existing sources similar to 
those the EPA sets for new and modified sources.32  In applying 
these standards to any given source, the state may “take into 
consideration, among other factors, the remaining useful life of 
the existing source to which such standard applies.”33  If a state 
fails to adopt an NSPS plan that meets EPA approval, the EPA 
must impose its own NSPS plan.34 
Major sources of air pollution are governed by the PSD 
provisions of the CAA.35  PSD defines major sources as those that 
emit or have the potential to emit 250 tpy of a regulated pollutant 
(100 tpy of several specified types, none of which are likely to 
apply to buildings).36  Under PSD, new or modified major sources 
must adopt specified emissions controls–“best available control 
technology” (BACT).  BACT is defined as: 
 
 27. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (defining standards of performance). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1). 
 29. Standards of Performance for GHGs for New Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 77 Fed. Reg. 22,392 (Apr. 13, 2012). 
 30. EPA, EPA Fact Sheet: Proposed Carbon Pollution Standard for New 
Power Plants, 2 (Mar. 27, 2012), http://epa.gov/carbonpollutionstandard/pdfs/ 
20120327factsheet.pdf; see also George Peridas, EPA’s New Power Plant Rule – 
How Does It Affect Coal-Fired Power Generation, SWITCHBOARD (Mar. 27, 2012), 
http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/gperidas/epas_new_power_plant_rule_-_ho. 
html. 
 31. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d). 
 32. Id. 
 33. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d)(1)(B). 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d). 
 35. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (2006). 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (2006). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/2
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[A]n emission limitation based on the maximum degree of 
reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under this 
chapter emitted from or which results from any major emitting 
facility, which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, 
taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts 
and other costs, determines is achievable for such facility through 
application of production processes and available methods, 
systems, and techniques . . . .37 
Sources subject to PSD must file permits to demonstrate 
regulatory compliance.38  These permits must be approved on a 
case-by-case basis, making sure that the particular source 
complies with permit requirements.39 
All sources that emit or have the potential to emit 100 tpy of 
a regulated pollutant are required to obtain Title V permits under 
the CAA.40  These permits require fees to the permitting 
authority and are limited to five years. 41  Title V permits have a 
long list of requirements, including enforceable emissions 
limitations, a schedule of compliance, and self-monitoring.42 
Very few facilities currently have to submit PSD and Title V 
permit applications.  Today, about 280 sources require PSD 
permits each year for either new construction or modifications.43  
Under the plain language of the CAA, the EPA estimates that 
almost 41,000 new and modified sources would require PSD 
permits, and millions of existing sources would require Title V 
permits.44 
GHGs, especially carbon dioxide, are emitted at much higher 
volumes than other air pollutants because other pollutants come 
from impurities in the fossil fuel burned, or incomplete 
 
 37. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). 
 38. 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (2006).  The permitting authorities are usually state – or 
local – level authorities, although the EPA can retain or recapture such 
authority at the federal level if states do not conform to federal standards. See 
40 C.F.R. pt. 70 (2012), for standards state permitting programs must follow. 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 7475. 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a (2006). 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 7661a(b). 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(a) (2006). 
 43. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,535 (June 3, 2010). 
 44. Id. 
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combustion.45  But carbon dioxide is one of the core results of 
combustion, and is therefore emitted at very high volumes.46  The 
result is that many, many sources are considered major sources 
for GHG emissions, while very few sources are major sources for 
emissions of other air pollutants. 
The cost of regulating GHG emissions from buildings under 
the CAA would be extremely high, both for permitting authorities 
and for owners of regulated buildings.  The EPA estimates that 
the compliance cost of Title V permits for GHG emissions would 
be over $49 billion for affected sources and over $21 billion for 
permitting authorities.47  Permitting authorities would have to 
spend 200 times what they currently do.48  Most (96%) of these 
sources would be commercial and residential buildings.49  The 
required cost to regulate GHG emissions by the plain language of 
the CAA would be astronomical and is therefore unrealistic. 
The CAA requires that new major sources receive 
individualized permit determinations of BACT as part of PSD.50  
For existing facilities, the CAA requires Title V permits for any 
source emitting more than 100 tpy of a regulated pollutant (now 
including GHGs).51  Furthermore, the EPA cannot exempt major 
sources from the requirements of Title V.52  Title V has stringent 
requirements for permitting major sources that imply 
individualized permit determinations.  Title V permits for major 
sources require enforceable emission limitations and standards, a 
schedule of compliance, submission of required self-monitoring, 
and an implementation plan.53  All Title V permits for major 
 
 45. See, e.g., Charles Ophardt, Combustion of Fossil Fuels, VIRTUAL 
CHEMBOOK: ELMHURST COLLEGE (2003),  available at http://www.elmhurst.edu/~ 
chm/vchembook/511natgascombust.html. 
 46. Id. (for example, natural gas is mostly methane, and the combustion of 
methane combines a molecule of methane with two molecules of oxygen to create 
a molecule of carbon dioxide, two molecules of water and lots of energy). 
 47. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL PREVENTION OF 
SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION AND TITLE V GREENHOUSE GAS TAILORING RULE 36 
(2010) [hereinafter REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS]. 
 48. Operating Permits Burden, supra note 9. 
 49. REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 47, at 29. 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006). 
 51. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 7602 (2006). 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 7661(a) (2006). 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 7661(c) (2006). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/2
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sources have to be sent from the permitting authority to the EPA 
for approval, as well as be available for public notice and 
comment.54 
III. THE TAILORING RULE IS LEGALLY SUSPECT 
A. The Tailoring Rule 
On May 13, 2010, the Obama Administration issued the 
Tailoring Rule, which regulates GHG emissions from major 
sources.  It controls the regulatory burden of regulating GHG 
emissions by sharply limiting the number of regulated sources.  
The Tailoring Rule regulates emissions of six GHGs: carbon 
dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, 
perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride.55  Since each of these 
GHGs has a different global warming potential (GWP) per ton of 
emissions, the EPA uses standard international practice and 
expresses GHGs in carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e).56  The 
Tailoring Rule details a three-step process for regulating GHG 
emissions from stationary sources.57 
During the first step of the Tailoring Rule, from January 2, 
2011 to June 30, 2011, the EPA did not force any stationary 
sources to get PSD or Title V permits solely for GHG emissions.58  
Instead, only sources that would otherwise require PSD or Title V 
permits for other air pollutants were subject to permitting for 
GHG emissions.59  The only sources subject to PSD requirements 
for Step 1 of the Tailoring Rule would be projects that increase 
 
 54. 42 U.S.C. § 7661(d) (2006) (EPA approval); 42 U.S.C. § 7661a (2012) 
(public notice and comment). 
 55. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,518 (June 3, 2010). 
 56. For the purpose of calculating GHG emissions limits, the GWPs of the 
different GHGs are: carbon dioxide (1), methane (21), nitrous oxide (310), HFC-
23 (11,700), HFC-134a (1,300), and sulfur hexafluoride (23,900).  These GWPs 
are calculated using a 100-year time horizon using the IPCC’s Second 
Assessment Report (SAR) in order to be consistent with the international 
standards under the United National Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) (IPCC, 1996). 
 57. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,516. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
9
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net GHG emissions by 75,000 tpy CO2e and significantly 
increased at least one non-GHG pollutant.60 
The second step of the Tailoring Rule is from July 1, 2011 to 
June 30, 2013.61  During this period, PSD permitting 
requirements cover new construction projects that emit at least 
100,000 tpy CO2e even if they do not exceed the permitting 
thresholds for any other pollutant.62  Modifications at existing 
facilities that increase GHG emissions by at least 75,000 tpy 
CO2e are also subject to permitting requirements, even if they do 
not significantly increase emissions of any other pollutant.63  
Also, facilities that emit at least 100,000 tpy CO2e are subject to 
Title V permitting requirements.64  EPA will need to issue about 
1,100 new Title V permits (mostly solid waste landfills and 
industrial manufacturers) and 900 additional PSD permits.65 
In the third step of the Tailoring Rule, the EPA chose to 
leave unchanged the GHG emission thresholds from Step 2.66  
The EPA also made other technical changes to streamline 
permitting for GHG emissions.67 
Furthermore, by the end of April 2015, the EPA will complete 
a study on remaining GHG permitting burdens that would exist if 
the CAA were fully applied to smaller sources.68  The results of 
this study will be used to complete a rule by April 30, 2016 
further addressing CAA permitting for these facilities.69  At that 
time, the EPA may decide that successful streamlining will allow 
them to require that more sources obtain permits, but the EPA 
also reserves the right to decide that certain smaller sources be 
permanently excluded from permitting.70 
 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 31,568. 
 66. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas 
Tailoring Rule Step 3 and GHG Applicability Limits, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,051, 41,052 
(July 12, 2012). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/2
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B. The EPA’s Arguments in Favor of the Legality of the
 Tailoring Rule 
As described above, the CAA requires that major sources get 
permits, which are subject to strict requirements and approved by 
permitting authorities on an individualized basis.  However, the 
Tailoring Rule states that most major sources of GHG emissions 
do not have to get permits at all.  The Tailoring Rule therefore 
clashes with the plain language of the CAA. 
The EPA gives three defenses for the Tailoring Rule and its 
sharp departure from the plain language of the CAA: 
(1)   Congress did not intend for the EPA and other 
permitting  authorities to have to issue so many 
permits for GHG emissions (absurd results); 
(2)   Permitting authorities cannot issue so many permits 
(impossibility or administrative necessity); 
(3)   Permitting authorities cannot issue so many permits 
now, and can postpone issuing so many permits until 
the future when they can do so. (one-step-at-a-time). 
Judicial review of regulations begins with Chevron, U.S.A. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council.71  In the two-part Chevron 
test, a reviewing court determines: 
(1) “First, always, is the question whether Congress has 
spoken directly to the precise question at issue. If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; 
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to 
the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” 
(2) “[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to 
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether 
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.”72 
The Tailoring Rule appears to fall afoul of Chevron.  The reasons 
for this require a close look at case law on similar cases, which I 
undertake below. 
 
 71. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). 
 72. Id. 
11
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a. Absurd Results 
1. Definition and Expansion of the Absurd Results 
Doctrine 
In general, courts interpret statutes according to their plain 
language, and the literal terms of a statute are to be overridden 
only when the absurdity is so gross as to shock the general moral 
or common sense.73  It is not enough that absurd consequences, 
which were probably not within the contemplation of the 
legislature, are produced.74 
A classic example of the absurd results doctrine is United 
States v. Kirby.75  In Kirby, a mail carrier was arrested for 
murder while delivering the mail.76  The police officers who 
arrested the mail carrier accused of murder were then indicted 
for knowing and willfully obstructing the passage of the mail.77  
The Supreme Court decided that the mail carrier’s arrest did not 
violate the federal law against obstructing mail delivery, even 
though the arrest while the mail carrier was delivering the mail 
did knowingly obstruct mail delivery.78  The Supreme Court 
allowed the police officers to violate the plain language of the 
statute because: 
All laws should receive a sensible construction.  General terms 
should be so limited in their application as not to lead to 
injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence.  It will always, 
therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions 
to its language, which would avoid results of this character.  The 
reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter.79 
In recent years, the absurd results doctrine has expanded to 
include any case where a statute is interpreted contrary to its 
 
 73. See Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930). 
 74. Id. 
 75. 74 U.S. 482 (1868). 
 76. Id. at 484. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 487. 
 79. Id. at 486-87. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/2
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plain meaning.80  In its brief to the D.C. Circuit defending the 
Tailoring Rule, the EPA defines the absurd results doctrine (for 
administrative agencies) as allowing an agency to divert from the 
literal meaning of a statute where “acceptance of that meaning 
would lead to absurd results . . . or would thwart the obvious 
purpose of the statute.”81 
The CAA requires major new and existing sources of GHG 
emissions to get individualized permits.  Major sources emit more 
than 100 or 250 tons per year (100/250 tpy) of a regulated air 
pollutant.82  For the Tailoring Rule to be legal by Chevron step 1, 
the EPA has to argue that the CAA’s requirement to regulate 
sources on an individualized basis emitting more than 100/250 
tpy of a regulated pollutant (which GHGs now are) is not clear.  If 
the Tailoring Rule is legal by Chevron step 1, then in Chevron 
step 2, EPA has to argue that the Tailoring Rule’s limitation of 
GHG regulation to sources emitting more than 100,000 tpy CO2e 
is a permissible construction of the CAA. 
2. The EPA’s Arguments That the Tailoring Rule 
Is Legal According to the Absurd Results 
Doctrine 
The EPA’s argument in its brief to the D.C. Circuit is based 
on their definition of the absurd results doctrine, which is that 
the plain language “would lead to absurd results . . . or would 
thwart the obvious purpose of the statute.”83  However, regulating 
more sources does not “thwart the obvious purpose of the 
 
 80. See Katherine Kirklin O’Brien, Comment, Beyond Absurdity: Climate 
Regulation and the Case for Restricting the Absurd Results Doctrine, 86 WASH. L. 
REV. 635, 638 (2011); NRDC v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating 
that a state could express limits on phosphorus under the Clean Water Act in 
terms of annual loads, even though the statute prescribes total maximum daily 
loads) (emphasis added). 
 81. Brief of Respondent at 64, Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 
No. 10-1073 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting In re Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 
436 U.S. 631, 633 (1978) (quoting Comm’r v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (1965))) 
[hereinafter EPA Brief]. 
 82. 42 U.S.C. § 7661(2) (2006). 
 83. EPA Brief, supra note 81, at 65 (quoting In re Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate 
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statute.”  The purpose of the CAA is to “promote reasonable . . . 
governmental actions . . . for pollution prevention.”84  As I show 
later in this paper, there are reasonable ways to regulate more 
sources.  Furthermore, regulating more sources of GHG emissions 
reduces GHG pollution and mitigates climate change. 
The EPA justifies the Tailoring Rule by stating that “the 
discretion accorded EPA to determine how to achieve Congress’s 
intended objective is particularly acute when a situation arises 
that may not have been contemplated by the specific terms of the 
statute,”85 and as long as “the agency exercises its delegated 
authority with common sense and fidelity to the intent of 
Congress, its decision must be upheld.”86 
In its defense of the Tailoring Rule, the EPA argues that it 
can unilaterally exclude entities from regulation that Congress 
has explicitly ordered it to regulate.  The EPA, and not Congress, 
would determine the scope of its own authority, and this violates 
both Chevron and the separation of powers under the 
Constitution.87 
Furthermore, the EPA’s position that it can exclude entities 
that Congress told it to regulate based on absurd results (or any 
other doctrine) is contradicted by case law.  In several cases, 
agencies have attempted to avoid regulating entities because of 
cost, stating that it would be absurd to spend large amounts of 
money to fulfill statutory mandates.  In these cases, courts force 
agencies to regulate the entities that Congress has mandated 
that they regulate. 
In Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) v. Hill, the Supreme 
Court forced the TVA to follow the statutory mandates of the 
 
 84. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(c) (2006). 
 85. EPA Brief, supra note 81, at 69 (citing United States v. Haggar Apparel 
Co., 526 U.S. 380, 393 (1999)). The EPA also cites Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. 
United States, 344 U.S. 298, 309-10 (1953); Indep. Bankers Ass’n v. Marine 
Midland Bank, 757 F.2d 453, 461 (2d Cir. 1985) (“Fashioning policies in 
response to events that were unforeseeable when the legislation was written is 
one of the primary functions of executive agencies.”). 
 86. EPA Brief, supra note 81, at 69-70 (citing Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co. v. 
Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., 836 F.2d 599, 612 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). 
 87. See Nathan A. Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron 
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Endangered Species Act (ESA), even though the ESA’s mandates 
would halt the nearly completed construction of the multi-million 
dollar Tellico Dam.88  The ESA requires that federal agencies do 
not take any action that is likely to jeopardize the continued 
existence of endangered or threatened species or destroy or 
adversely modify the habitat of such species.89  When the Tellico 
Dam was almost complete, biologists discovered a previously 
unknown species of perch, the snail darter.90  The area that 
would be flooded by the Tellico Dam was the only known habitat 
of the snail darter, and therefore there was legitimate fear that 
the completion of the Tellico Dam would render the snail darter 
extinct.91  This triggered District Court litigation for an 
injunction against the completion of the Tellico Dam.92 
The District Court ruled that it would be absurd to require “a 
court to halt impoundment of water behind a fully completed dam 
if an endangered species were discovered in the river on the day 
before such impoundment was scheduled to take place.  We 
cannot conceive that Congress intended such a result.”93  The 
Court of Appeals reversed and issued an injunction against the 
completion of the Tellico Dam.94  The Supreme Court agreed, 
maintaining the injunction and thereby rejecting TVA’s claim 
that following the plain language of the ESA and prohibiting the 
completion of a near complete multimillion dollar dam would be 
absurd.95  TVA v. Hill stands for the idea that the absurd results 
doctrine cannot be used to overturn the plain language of 
Congressional statutes just because following those dictates 
would be expensive.  Similarly, the EPA is at risk of having a 
court vacate the Tailoring Rule on the merits because it does not 
regulate most major sources of GHG emissions that Congress 
demands the EPA regulate. 
 
 88. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
 89. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (2006).  This part of the ESA is unchanged since its 
original passage.  See TVA, 437 U.S. at 160. 
 90. TVA, 437 U.S. at 158. 
 91. Id. at 162-63. 
 92. Id. at 165-66. 
 93. Id. at 166-67 (citing Hill v. TVA, 419 F. Supp. 753, 763 (E.D. Tenn. 
(1976)). 
 94. Hill v. TVA, 549 F.2d 1064, 1069 (6th Cir. 1977). 
 95. TVA, 437 U.S. at 195. 
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The most damning indictment of the Tailoring Rule comes 
from current interpretations of the Clean Water Act (CWA).  The 
CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants into the waters of the 
United States without a permit.96  A permit can be granted 
pursuant to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES).97 
In two cases, Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. 
Costle,98 and Northwest Environmental Advocates v. EPA,99 the 
EPA attempted to exclude categories of pollution sources from 
permit requirements of the NPDES and was rebuked by federal 
appeals courts.  In both cases, the EPA lost and was forced to 
regulate the sources of pollution that it tried to exclude.  These 
decisions suggest that the Tailoring Rule is legally suspect 
because it excludes from regulation sources of pollution that 
Congress requires the EPA to regulate. 
In NRDC v. Costle, the EPA excluded several classes of 
pollution sources from NPDES permit requirements that 
otherwise would have required permits by the plain language of 
the CWA.100  For example, concentrated animal feeding 
operations (CAFOs) are defined as point sources in the CWA and 
require permits, but EPA’s 1973 regulations stated that CAFOs 
below a certain size did not require permits.101  The EPA justified 
the exclusion of small CAFOs and other pollution sources by 
stating that it wanted to conserve its enforcement resources for 
more significant sources of water pollution.102 
Furthermore, the justifications for the EPA’s unlawful 
exclusion of sources from regulation in NRDC v. Costle sound 
similar to EPA’s justifications for the Tailoring Rule.  The D.C. 
Circuit stated: 
The appellants have stressed . . . the extraordinary burden on the 
EPA that will be imposed by [forcing EPA to require permits of 
 
 96. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2006). 
 97. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006). 
 98. 568 F.2d 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 99. 537 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 100. 568 F.2d at 1377. 
 101. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2006) (defining point sources); 40 C.F.R. § 125.4 
(1975), vacated by NRDC, 568 F.2d 1369. 
 102. Costle, 568 F.2d at 1372-73. 
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sources now excluded].  The spectre of millions of applications for 
permits is evoked both as part of appellants’ legislative history 
[absurd results] argument that Congress could not have intended 
to impose such burdens on the EPA . . . .103 
The D.C. Circuit went on to reject the EPA’s concerns, stating, 
“[t]he technological or administrative infeasibility of such 
limitations may result in adjustments in the permit programs . . . 
but it does not authorize the Administrator to exclude the 
relevant point source from the NPDES program.”104  The D.C. 
Circuit made this decision even though it acknowledged that over 
400,000 additional sources might require permits.105 
Similarly, the EPA promulgated a regulation that excluded 
several types of discharges from ships (vessels) from permitting 
requirements, and in Northwest Environmental Advocates v. 
EPA, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the vacating of the EPA’s 
regulation.106  In this case, the EPA had excluded vessel wastes 
from NPDES permitting requirements in order to “reduce 
administrative costs drastically.”107  This is similar to the goals of 
the Tailoring Rule.  However, the text of the CWA does not 
exempt vessel discharges from NPDES requirements.108  EPA’s 
defense of its regulation did not explicitly use the absurd results 
doctrine, but did state that the CWA could be interpreted to 
exclude vessel discharges from CWA permit requirements.  But 
the Ninth Circuit followed NRDC v. Costle and forced the EPA to 
regulate the vessel discharges in question.109 
To summarize, the precedents of TVA v. Hill, NRDC v. 
Costle, and Northwest Environmental Advocates v. EPA strongly 
suggest that an agency cannot use the large number of permits or 
cost of providing those permits required under law as a 
justification for promulgating a regulation that waives permitting 
 
 103. Id. at 1377. 
 104. Id. at 1379. 
 105. Id. at 1380. 
 106. 537 F.3d 1006, 1010 (9th Cir. 2008) (affirming the district court decision 
to vacate 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(a) (2006)). 
 107. National Pollution Discharge System, 38 Fed. Reg. 13,528, 13,528 (May 
22, 1973). 
 108. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006). 
 109. Nw. Envtl. Advocates, 537 F.3d at 1021. 
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for most of those sources of pollution.  This suggests that the 
EPA’s “absurd results” justification for the Tailoring Rule would 
likely be rejected by a court reaching a decision on the merits of 
the rule. 
b. Administrative Necessity 
The CAA provides the EPA with a very difficult problem 
because it was not designed to mitigate climate change.110  The 
last major amendments to the CAA were made in 1990, when 
climate change was not broadly debated in Congress.111  At the 
same time, the CAA is a blanket statute meant to deal with all 
air pollutants, and carbon dioxide is an air pollutant by the letter 
of the CAA.  Attempts to update or supersede the CAA to mitigate 
climate change have died in Congress. 
Without the Tailoring Rule, millions of smaller sources would 
require permits under the CAA, compared to about 15,000 
stationary sources today.112  The EPA’s position is that the 
administrative burdens of permitting large numbers of newly-
subject sources would “greatly increas[e] the number of required 
permits, impos[e] undue costs on small sources, overwhelm[] the 
resources of permitting authorities, and severely impair[] the 
functioning of the programs.”113  The Tailoring Rule is designed 
to avoid overburdening the EPA and state and local permitting 
agencies.114 
The D.C. Circuit gave its standard for administrative 
necessity in Alabama Power v. Costle.115  Alabama Power is a 
very complicated case, dealing with regulations under the CAA as 
 
 110. See, e.g., Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal Control of Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions, 40 ENV. L. 1261, 1323 (2010) (“The CAA is not a tool designed to deal 
with GHG emissions, or more specifically CO2.”); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal 
Control of Carbon Dioxide Emissions: What Are the Options?, 36 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 111. But see generally AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE (1992) (detailing Gore’s 
vision for solving the world’s environmental crises, including climate change). 
 112. EPA, Final Rule: Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V 
Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule: Fact Sheet (May 13, 2010), http://www.epa.gov 
/nsr/documents/20100413fs.pdf. 
 113. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,514 (June 3, 2010). 
 114. Id. 
 115. 636 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
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they existed after the 1977 Amendments (but before the 1990 
amendments which created the current CAA).116  One major issue 
was the promulgation of an EPA regulation that excluded sources 
that actually emitted less than 50 tpy (but had the potential to 
emit more than the PSD program’s 100/250 tpy threshold) from 
the CAA’s statutory requirement to regulate sources with the 
potential to emit more than 100/250 tpy.117  The D.C. Circuit 
overturned this regulation as beyond agency discretion.118 
The D.C. Circuit justified the overturning of the regulation 
above by developing a test for agency claims of administrative 
necessity.  For cases in which an agency seeks approval of a 
prospective exemption of certain categories from a statutory 
demand (like the Tailoring Rule and Alabama Power), the test is 
as follows: 
● “[c]ategorical exemptions from the clear commands of a 
regulatory statute, though sometimes permitted, are not 
favored.”119  The court uses NRDC v. Costle (where the EPA 
tried to exempt categories of pollution sources from permit 
requirements of the CWA) as precedent to deny categorical 
exemptions from statutory mandates.120 
● “Categorical exemptions may also be permissible as an 
exercise of agency power . . . to overlook circumstances that 
in context may fairly be considered de minimis.”121 
● But, “[t]hat implied authority [of categorical exemptions 
for de minimis] is not available for a situation where the 
regulatory function does provide benefits, in the sense of 
furthering the regulatory objectives, but the agency 
concludes that the acknowledged benefits are exceeded by 
the costs.”122 
The Tailoring Rule is legally suspect according to the precedent of 
Alabama Power because it exempts categories of emitters from 
regulation (those between 100/250 and 75,000/100,000 tpy CO2e) 
 
 116. See id. at 349. 
 117. Id. at 355-56. 
 118. Id. at 356. 
 119. Id. at 358. 
 120. Id. at 360. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 361. 
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instead of using streamlined methods of administering an 
expanded regulatory program.  Furthermore, the Tailoring Rule 
is legally suspect because it is a categorical exemption by rule 
that cannot be fairly called de minimis.  By the EPA’s own 
admission, without the Tailoring Rule, 78% of total national 
stationary source GHG emissions would be regulated, compared 
with 67% of such emissions with the Tailoring Rule.123 
c. One-Step-at-a-Time 
The one-step-at-a-time doctrine comes from case law, and 
recognizes that agencies may implement statutory mandates 
incrementally when the agency remains on track to implement 
the statutory mandate as a whole.124  In promulgating the 
Tailoring Rule, the EPA argues that more time to implement 
regulation of GHG emissions will allow time to “develop 
streamlining measures, acquire expertise, and increase 
resources.”125 
The test for one-step-at-a-time agency implementation of 
statutory mandates was developed by the D.C. Circuit in 
National Ass’n of Broadcasters v. Federal Communications 
Commission.126  In Broadcasters, the court examined the FCC’s 
interim regulations of new satellite broadcasting technology 
called “direct broadcast satellite service” (DBS).127  The interim 
regulations left crucial details about how to allocate spectrum 
until a future rulemaking.128  Several intervenors sued to 
overturn this part of the regulation, calling it arbitrary and 
capricious.129 
The D.C. Circuit developed a two-part test for one-step-at-a-
time rulemaking: 
(1) “As long as the agency’s predictions [of the nature and 
magnitude of the problem it will have to confront when 
 
 123. Operating Permits Burden, supra note 9.  
 124. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed Reg. 31,514, 31,544 (June 3, 2010). 
 125. Id. at 31,533. 
 126. Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 127. Id. at 1195. 
 128. Id. at 1209. 
 129. Id. 
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it comes to resolve the postponed issue] of future events 
are plausible and flow from the factual record compiled, 
a reviewing court should accept the agency’s 
estimation.”130 
(2) “Postponement will be most easily justified when an 
agency acts against a background of rapid technical and 
social change and when the agency’s initial decision as 
a practical matter is reversible should the future 
proceedings yield drastically unexpected results.”131  In 
contrast, an incremental approach to agency decision 
making is least justified when small errors in predictive 
judgment can have catastrophic effects on the public 
welfare, or when future proceedings are likely to be 
systematically defective in taking into account certain 
relevant interests.132 
The FCC passed that test in Broadcasters.133  First, the FCC had 
reasonable estimates of the nature and magnitude of the problem 
it had to confront.134  Second, DBS technology was so new that 
the FCC could not predict the demand for spectrum.135  So the 
FCC waited a short period of time and then promulgated a 
regulation to answer the spectrum allocation questions left 
unanswered in the interim regulation.136 
The FCC’s two-part test needs to be evaluated in context 
with the rest of the case.  The D.C. Circuit in Broadcasters states 
that agencies have “no authority to experiment with its statutory 
obligations.”137  This statement is made concerning part of the 
DBS regulation that exempted some DBS systems from the 
broadcast restrictions of Title III of the Communications Act of 
1934.138  These include, but are not limited to, requirements that 
 
 130. Id. at 1210. 
 131. Id. at 1211. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1211. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 1212. 
 137. Id. at 1201. 
 138. Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1199. 
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qualified candidates for office be provided reasonable access to 
broadcast facilities.139 
However, section 3(o) of the Communications Act defined 
“broadcasting” as “the dissemination of radio communications 
intended to be received by the public, directly or by the 
intermediary of relay stations.”140  This meant that exempting 
DBS systems that transmitted signals directly to homes was 
unlawful, and that part of the FCC’s DBS regulations was 
overturned.141 
In this respect, the Tailoring Rule is very similar to the part 
of the DBS regulation in Broadcasters; both attempt to exempt 
categories of entities explicitly regulated by statute from 
regulation.  The D.C. Circuit would not allow this in 
Broadcasters, and is unlikely to allow the EPA to exempt major 
sources of GHG emissions from CAA regulation.  The Tailoring 
Rule does not promise to regulate all major sources of GHG 
emissions under the CAA; instead the EPA only promises a study 
and further rulemaking in 2016.142  The EPA justifies this by 
noting that it can exclude some major sources from regulation 
through the absurd results doctrine.143  So if the use of the 
absurd results doctrine in the Tailoring Rule is unlawful, so is the 
use of the one-step-at-a-time doctrine. 
Furthermore, it is questionable whether the EPA could pass 
the second prong of Broadcasters two-part test for use of the one-
step-at-a-time doctrine.  The second prong requires a background 
of “rapid technical and social change.”144  In Broadcasters, there 
was serious uncertainty about the use of spectrum associated 
with new technology, which was crucial information to the 
regulation.145  The EPA asserts that it is working within 
uncertain factual circumstances and future events because the 
ability of the EPA to follow the statutory directive depends not 
 
 139. Id. at 1200. 
 140. Id. at 1201. 
 141. Id. at 1203. 
 142. Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31,514, 31,516 (June 3, 2010). 
 143. Id. 
 144. Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1211. 
 145. Id. at 1209. 
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only on the development of streamlining measures, but also on 
enhancing the resources of permitting agencies.146 
There is always uncertainty, so the type of uncertainty 
relevant to whether or not the EPA can comply with the letter of 
the law is whether the factual landscape is so uncertain that they 
cannot adequately regulate.  In Broadcasters, the FCC was 
hesitant to regulate a very new technology where no one knew 
how the technology would develop.147  With the Tailoring Rule, 
patterns of carbon emissions do not change quickly and can be 
determined.  The federal government might not have this 
information right now, but they can and should have this 
information well before 2016, the date at which the EPA plans to 
possibly comply with the plain language of the CAA. 
The EPA is correct when they state that there is uncertainty 
about future budgets of both the EPA and permitting authorities.  
Mass. v. EPA did greatly change enforcement of the CAA, as it 
potentially added millions of sources, mostly buildings, to the 
CAA regulatory program.  However, this could be said about all 
agencies and all regulations.  Furthermore, enforcement of the 
CWA has had similar issues of large-scale expansion of the 
number of permits required.  The vacating of the EPA’s 
regulation excluding many vessels caused between 115,000 and 
138,000 smaller vessels and about 71,000 larger vessels to require 
permits.148 
To conclude, the EPA likely cannot defend the Tailoring Rule 
using the one-step-at-a-time doctrine.  The Tailoring Rule likely 
fails the second prong of the test in Broadcasters (“rapid technical 
and social change”), and Broadcasters probably cannot be 
interpreted to allow agencies to preemptively exempt a category 
of sources from anti-pollution regulations. 
 
 146. See Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. at 31,547. 
 147. Nat’l Ass’n of Broadcasters, 740 F.2d at 1211. 
 148. See EPA, ECONOMIC AND BENEFITS ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED SMALL 
VESSEL GENERAL PERMIT ix (Nov. 30, 2011), available at  
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/vgp_economic_analysis_svgp2011.pdf (number of 
smaller vessels requiring permits) [hereinafter SMALL VESSEL GENERAL PERMIT]; 
EPA, ECONOMIC AND BENEFITS ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED 2013 VESSEL GENERAL 
PERMIT 1 (2011), available at  http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/vgp_ 
economic_analysis_draftpermit2011.pdf (number of larger vessels, including 
domestic flag and foreign flag vessels, requiring permits). 
23
  
2012] USING BUILDING CODES 81 
 
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF USING BUILDING 
CODES TO REGULATE GHG EMISSIONS UNDER 
THE CAA 
Earlier in this paper, I stated the three possible approaches 
the EPA could use to regulate GHG emissions from buildings: 
(1)  follow the plain language of the CAA and require 
millions of buildings (and other sources of GHG 
emissions) to get individualized permits–costing 
permitting agencies $22.5 billion;149 
(2)  regulate fewer buildings on an individualized basis.  
The EPA chose to do this with the Tailoring Rule, and 
the Tailoring Rule costs permitting agencies only $105 
million, instead of $22.5 billion.150  However, the 
Tailoring Rule leaves millions of buildings unregulated 
that the CAA and Mass. v. EPA imply should be 
regulated; or 
(3)  regulate millions of buildings on a general (not 
individualized) basis, issuing regulations for certain 
types of buildings, rather than for each individual 
building.  In this paper, I propose that the EPA regulate 
buildings emitting more than 100 or 250 tpy CO2e by 
forcing states to enact more energy-efficient building 
codes for those buildings. 
Option 2, embodied in the Tailoring Rule, is legally suspect.  In 
the rest of this paper, I demonstrate that Option 3, forcing states 
to adopt more energy efficient building codes, is both legally 
sound and good policy. 
A. The EPA’s Description of Its Options 
On July 12, 2012, the EPA released its final rule for Step 3 of 
the Tailoring Rule.151  Its proposed rule maintains the 
applicability thresholds (75,000/100,000 tpy CO2e) and proposed 
streamlining approaches to improve the administration of GHG 
 
 149. Operating Permits Burden, supra note 9.  
 150. Id. 
 151. Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas 
Tailoring Rule Step 3 and GHG Applicability Limitations, 77 Fed. Reg. 41,051, 
41,055 (July 12, 2012). 
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PSD and Title V permitting programs.152  The proposed rule also 
solicits comments on these streamlining approaches, including 
general permits and presumptive BACT (pBACT) in case EPA is 
forced to regulate all sources above the statutory threshold.153  
The EPA concluded that these options were promising, but would 
take more than two years to develop, propose, and finalize and 
therefore would not be available by January 2, 2011, the date 
PSD and Title V permitting requirements would be triggered. 
 The proposed rule shows that the EPA is struggling with the 
idea of how to regulate smaller major sources.  In 2010, EPA 
estimated that PSD and Title V requirements would require 
regulation of over six million sources.154  Almost 1.4 million of 
those sources are commercial, while another 4.5 million of those 
sources are residential.155  Almost 179,000 of those sources are 
industrial.156 
B. General Permits 
The CAA authorizes general permits for existing major 
sources (Title V), but not for new major sources (PSD).  A general 
permit covers numerous single sources and is completed after 
notice and opportunity for a public hearing.157  Sources subject to 
a general permit must still apply for that permit and fulfill all of 
the requirements of that permit.158 
Permit applications have to have (a) a date the permit is 
active, and (b) a compliance plan for how the source will comply 
with all applicable requirements, including a schedule of 
compliance and a schedule by which a permittee will submit 
progress reports at least every six months.159  The permitting 
official shall certify the accuracy of the information submitted, 
and a copy of each permit application, compliance plan (including 
schedule of compliance), emissions or compliance monitoring 
 
 152. Id. at 41,052. 
 153. Id. at 41,055. 
 154. REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, supra note 47, at 29. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(d) (2006). 
 158. Id. 
 159. 42 U.S.C. § 7661b (2006). 
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report, certification, and issued permit shall be available to the 
public.160  The conditions attached to general permits come from 
the rest of the CAA. 
Under the CAA, the EPA lists categories of stationary 
sources that can “reasonably be anticipated to endanger public 
health or welfare.”161  There are separate standards for new and 
existing sources, and the standards for existing sources take into 
account the remaining useful life of the source and other 
factors.162 
The EPA may find it very difficult, if not impossible, to 
enforce all of the requirements of general permits for GHG 
emissions from buildings.  The permitting official may not even 
be able to certify the accuracy of the information submitted.  
However, a copy of each permit application and each issued 
permit can be made available to the public electronically, 
fulfilling the language of the CAA. 
General permits exist under the CAA and other 
environmental laws.  The exact nature of general permits varies 
from state to state, but the number of general permits is 
extensive.  To take Pennsylvania as an example, Pennsylvania 
has a very long list of general permits.163  Many of these general 
permits are CAA permits.  They include (but are not limited to): 
storage tanks for volatile organic liquids, burn-off ovens, 
petroleum dry cleaning, nonroad engines, crematories, dry 
abrasive blasting operations, and others. 
Most general permits are under the Clean Water Act (CWA).  
Examples of these permits include Construction General Permits, 
Nationwide Permits, and Vessel General Permits. 
 
 160. Id. 
 161. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006). 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Licensing, Permits and Certification, PA. DEP’T OF ENVTL. PROT., 
http://www.depweb.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/licensing%2C_permit
s___certification/6009 (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
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a. Construction General Permits 
Construction General Permits (CGPs) under § 402 of the 
Clean Water Act (CWA)164 regulate stormwater discharges 
associated with construction activity (such as cleaning, grading, 
excavating, and stockpiling) that disturb one or more acres, or 
smaller sites that are part of a larger common plan of 
development or sale.  This is part of the CWA’s National Pollution 
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) stormwater program.165  
Prior to discharging stormwater, construction operators must 
obtain coverage under an NPDES permit, which is administered 
by the state (if it has been authorized to operate the NPDES 
stormwater program) or EPA, depending on where the 
construction site is located.  The CGP requires compliance with 
effluent limits and other permit requirements, such as the 
development of a Stormwater Pollution Prevention Plan 
(SWPPP). Construction operators intending to seek coverage 
under EPA’s CGP must submit a Notice of Intent (NOI) certifying 
that they have met the permit’s eligibility conditions and that 
they will comply with the permit’s requirements (install and 
maintain Best Management Practices, conduct biweekly 
inspections, record any plan changes, etc.).  The operator submits 
the NOI online. 
b. Nationwide Permits 
The Nationwide Permit Program (NWP) under § 404(e) of the 
CWA,166 which authorizes the discharge of dredged or fill 
materials into waters of the U.S., was specifically designed to 
provide a relatively streamlined mechanism for the Corps to 
approve projects with relatively minor environmental impacts, 
freeing the Corps to use administrative resources for more 
environmentally significant requests for individual permits.167  In 
 
 164. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006); see also EPA Construction General Permit, EPA, 
http://cfpub.epa.gov/npdes/stormwater/cgp.cfm#final2008cgp (last visited Oct. 
30, 2012). 
 165. Id. 
 166. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2006). 
 167. Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders to Lisa Jackson, Adm’r, EPA 
(April 20, 2012) (on file with author) (comments on Prevention of Significant 
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its comments to the EPA, the National Association of Home 
Builders (NAHB) states that over time the Corps has made the 
NWP requirements more stringent to limit their availability and 
make them more cumbersome and difficult to obtain.168  NAHB 
notes that when first adopted, a project proponent who believed 
his or her project met an NWP’s requirements could proceed 
immediately, operating under the auspices and protection of the 
NWP without further notice to the Corps.  Now, the Corps 
requires most applicants to comply with extensive pre-
construction notification requirements.  Likewise, current NWPs 
impose significant paperwork burdens both on those who use the 
NWPs and the Corps staff who have to implement the 
requirements, creating delays and undermining the 
administrative efficiency the NWPs were originally designed to 
achieve.169  The average applicant for a nationwide permit spends 
313 days and $28,915—not counting costs of mitigation or design 
changes.170 
The experience with the NWP permit suggests that general 
permits for GHG emissions would have to be extremely 
streamlined to be at all practical. 
c. Vessel General Permits (including Small Vessel 
General Permits) 
The EPA regulates vessel (ship) discharges with the Vessel 
General Permit (VGP).  The VGP regulates discharges incidental 
to the normal operation of vessels operating in a capacity as a 
means of transportation.  The VGP includes general effluent 
limits applicable to all discharges; general effluent limits 
applicable to 26 specific discharge streams; narrative water-based 
effluent limits; inspection, monitoring, recordkeeping, and 
reporting requirements; and additional requirements applicable 
to certain vessel types.  Submission is generally through the 
Vessels eNOI system. 
 
Deterioration and Title V Greenhouse Gas Tailoring Rule Step 3, Docket 
Number EPA-HQ-OAR-2009-0517, at 5-6). 
 168. Id. at 6. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 721 (2006) (plurality opinion). 
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The EPA has proposed a Small Vessel General Permit 
(sVGP) for non-recreational, non-military vessels less than 79 
feet, starting in 2013.171  To get a sVGP, a vessel operator must: 
● Meet the sVGP eligibility requirements; 
● Obtain a Permit Authorization and Record of Inspection 
(PARI) form onboard their vessel to certify that they have read 
and understood the terms of the permit and to document 
performance of the required annual inspection (there is no 
requirement to submit a Notice of Intent); 
● Implement the effluent limits according to the requirements 
in Part 2 of the sVGP, including by conducting routine 
inspections that may be needed to verify compliance with the 
discharge limits; and 
● Conduct the required annual self-inspection.172 
Between 115,000 and 138,000 vessels will be potentially subject 
to the sVGP.173  EPA finds that per vessel incremental 
compliance costs average between $17 and $98 per year, 
depending on the number of applicable discharge categories and 
baseline practices.174  A majority of vessels subject to the sVGP 
are commercial fishing vessels.175 
d. Problems with the Use of General Permits under 
the CWA and CAA 
The EPA has accepted the problems associated with the use 
of general permits to fulfill permitting requirements under the 
CWA.  It has not had much choice; several parts of the CWA 
would be unworkable without general permits because of the 
large number of entities that require permits.  Many pollution 
plans are neither reviewed nor approved by the government, and 
there is limited public participation in permit issuance and 
enforcement.176 
 
 171. SMALL VESSEL GENERAL PERMIT, supra note 148, at ix. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at x. 
 175. Id. at 4. 
 176. See Jeffrey M. Gaba, Generally Illegal: NPDES General Permits Under 
the Clean Water Act, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 410, 412 (2007). 
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Similarly, the EPA would have to accept problems with a 
general permit regime under the CAA to regulate GHGs.  The 
huge numbers of permits required means that the EPA cannot 
allow comment on individual permits if it hopes to administer the 
program.  Furthermore, EPA’s ability to regulate existing 
buildings may be severely limited, even with the use of general 
permits, because millions of buildings need to be regulated.  This 
is especially true because the CAA allows for citizen suits to 
enforce permit requirements or dereliction of nondiscretionary 
duties by the EPA Administrator.177 
Furthermore, EPA’s ability to enforce general permits may 
be very limited.  In some cases, the general permit process may 
be simply a notification of requirements under the law, and 
violations of those requirements will tend to go unnoticed and 
unpunished.  This is mostly unavoidable with a very large 
number of permits, and the notification of requirements coming 
from the general permit may be enough to induce at least limited 
compliance, which is probably an improvement over no regulation 
at all for relatively small emitters. 
C. Presumptive BACT (pBACT) 
PSD requires that new sources of regulated pollutants (now 
including GHGs) be subject to best available control technology 
(BACT).  BACT is defined in the CAA as: 
[A]n emission limitation based on the maximum degree of 
reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under this Act 
emitted from or which results from any major emitting facility, 
which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking 
into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and 
other costs, determines is achievable for such facility through 
application of production processes and available methods, 
systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or 
treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of 
each such pollutant.178 
 
 177. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006). 
 178. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006). 
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To determine BACT, EPA usually uses a five-step “top-down” 
analysis. 
The steps are: (1) “[i]dentify all available control 
technologies;” (2) “[e]liminate technically infeasible options;” (3) 
evaluate and rank the remaining technologies based on 
environmental effectiveness; (4) evaluate the cost-effectiveness of 
controls after considering energy and other environmental 
impacts; and (5) “[s]elect BACT.”179  The primary guidance is 
EPA’s 1990 New Source Review Workshop Manual.180  
Determining the appropriate technology requires consideration of 
process changes, fuel substitution, add-on controls, and any other 
available methods to obtain the maximum degree of emission 
reduction.181  The process begins by requiring a permit applicant 
seeking a permit to meet new source performance standards 
(NSPS) for its industrial category (promulgated by EPA pursuant 
to section 111 of the CAA).182  States may impose additional 
standards, and EPA may delegate authority to run the PSD 
program to states.183  Many states administer all or part of the 
PSD program.  However, there is no technology to control CO2 
emissions that appears to fit the BACT definition in the CAA.184 
Since BACT must now be done on a case-by-case basis for 
each permit applicant, EPA is evaluating the use of pBACT, 
under which it would develop a “standardized BACT for certain 
emissions units [sources of GHG emissions].”185  Similar to 
general permits, the agency would determine pBACT for certain 
sources and expect industry to comply with its determination.186  
 
 179. GHG Plantwide Applicability Limitations and GHG Synthetic Minor 
Limitations, 77 Fed. Reg. 14,226, 14,252 (Mar. 8, 2012). 
 180. EPA, DRAFT NEW SOURCE REVIEW WORKSHOP MANUAL: PREVENTION OF 
SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION AND NONATTAINMENT AREA PERMITTING (1990), 
http://www.epa.gov/ttn/nsr/gen/wkshpman.pdf [hereinafter NEW SOURCE REVIEW 
WORKSHOP MANUAL]. 
 181. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). 
 182. 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006). 
 183. 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (2006). 
 184. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Clean Air Symposium: The Intersection of Climate 
Change and Clean Air Act Stationary Source Programs, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 901, 
916 (2011); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3). 
 185. GHG Plantwide Applicability Limitations and GHG Synthetic Minor 
Limitations, 77 Fed. Reg. 14,226, 14,252 (Mar. 8, 2012). 
 186. Id. at 14,251. 
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EPA suggests that pBACT could be implemented through the 
general permit process.187  EPA uses natural gas-fired boilers as 
an example application of pBACT and expressly suggests tying 
pBACT to the Department of Energy’s (DOE) statutory obligation 
to set energy efficiency standards or to the ENERGY STAR 
program.188 
EPA has considered several approaches to implement 
pBACT.  The first approach would develop, through notice-and-
comment rulemaking or permitting guidance, a pBACT level for 
sources in a particular source category that subsequently could be 
applied and assessed in individual permitting actions.189  In that 
approach, the top-down analysis for an individual permit would 
be fulfilled by a request to include the pBACT limit; there would 
still be an opportunity for permitting authorities and the public to 
examine individual permits to assess whether there are 
significant case-specific energy, economic, and/or environmental 
impacts that would require adjustment of the presumed limit for 
that particular source.190  This shifts the burden to the 
permitting authority or other interested parties to produce 
credible evidence that the application of pBACT to a particular 
source would not comply with BACT requirements.191 
This approach might be suitable and appropriate for some 
relatively large sources.  However, for smaller sources, this could 
be problematic because it would give extra opportunities for anti-
development forces to stop development by challenging the 
energy efficiency of a development.  This could even be a problem 
for larger sources; some large apartment buildings emit tens of 
thousands of GHGs per year, and anti-development activists 
could challenge these permits in order to stop development. 
 The EPA has also discussed an approach where pBACT 
levels for a specific category of emissions would be developed 
through notice-and-comment rulemaking, and public comment 
would not be allowed for an individual source.  This would not 
 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 14,251 (natural gas boilers as example for general permits and 
pBACT); Id. at 14,254 (tying pBACT to ENERGY STAR program). 
 189. Id. at 14,252-53. 
 190. Id. at 14,253. 
 191. Id. 
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follow the individual case-by-case BACT determinations 
envisioned in the CAA, but would be much more practical for 
regulating large numbers of small sources.192 
Using pBACT would streamline PSD permitting and promote 
consistency in BACT determinations as various permitting 
authorities gain experience with GHG permitting.193  The EPA is 
especially interested in combining general permits and pBACT, 
but worries that it might lose the technology forcing aspect of 
case-by-case BACT determinations.194  Controls identified in 
prior permits are considered in subsequent BACT 
determinations, so an approach using pBACT could lose that.195  
Periodic revisions of pBACT could avoid this.  Combining these 
approaches could provide an economical means of issuing very 
large numbers of permits and achieving reductions in GHG 
emissions from buildings and other stationary sources from 
smaller major emitters not currently covered by the Tailoring 
Rule. 
D. Building Codes 
EPA attempts to justify the Tailoring Rule by noting that 
millions of buildings would be subject to regulation for GHG 
emissions without the Tailoring Rule.  However, the EPA’s 
justification does not acknowledge that all buildings are already 
subject to government regulation–building codes.  These codes are 
generally state and local codes, but they cover every local home 
and business. 
a. The Legality of Using Building Codes to Regulate 
GHG Emissions 
Under PSD, new major sources are regulated using BACT.  
BACT is defined in the CAA as: 
[A]n emission limitation based on the maximum degree of 
reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation under this Act 
 
 192. See discussion infra Part IV.d. 
 193. See 77 Fed. Reg. at 14,253. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. 
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emitted from or which results from any major emitting facility, 
which the permitting authority, on a case-by-case basis, taking 
into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and 
other costs, determines is achievable for such facility through 
application of production processes and available methods, 
systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or 
treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques for control of 
each such pollutant.196 
As stated above, this provides a problem in that many new major 
sources would have to apply for permits, which would have to be 
approved on a case-by-case basis.  This would be very expensive, 
both for permittees and permitting agencies. 
The EPA’s idea for combining general permits and pBACT is 
a good idea, but in order to use it for PSD, the EPA has to be able 
to interpret BACT as allowing the use of categorical (and not 
case-by-case) determinations for smaller major sources of GHG 
emissions.  In fact, case law suggests that the EPA can (and 
should) interpret the CAA in this fashion. 
In Alabama Power, the D.C. Circuit states that “[c]ourts 
frequently uphold streamlined agency approaches or procedures 
where the conventional course, typically case-by-case 
determinations, would, as a practical matter, prevent the agency 
from carrying out the mission assigned to it by Congress.”197  It is 
clear that the EPA cannot do case-by-case determination for tens 
of thousands of new buildings and millions of existing buildings.  
Even though it may depart from the statutory requirements of 
BACT, using pBACT and general permits for smaller major 
sources of GHG emissions may be closer to the congressional 
intent for the PSD program.198 
Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Shalala,199 also supports this 
interpretation.  Mova Pharmaceutical Corp. concerned the 
question of whether the FDA could approve a drug that was being 
attacked under a patent infringement action.200  The D.C. Circuit 
 
 196. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006). 
 197. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
 198. See 77 Fed. Reg. at 14,253. 
 199. 140 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 200. Id. at 1062. 
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disagreed with the FDA’s interpretation of the underlying 
statute, writing “[w]hen the agency concludes that a literal 
reading of a statute would thwart the purposes of Congress, it 
may deviate no further from the statute than is needed to protect 
congressional intent.”201  A rule that avoids using case-by-case 
determination of BACT and regulates all of the sources that 
Congress says to regulate does less violence to the statute than 
the Tailoring Rule, which does not regulate all of the sources that 
Congress says to regulate.  Alabama Power also states, “[b]efore a 
court sanctions such actions, it will carefully study the governing 
statute . . . to ascertain whether the statute authorizes 
approaches that deviate from the legislative mandate in response 
to concerns about feasibility.”202  The use of general permits and 
pBACT to regulate smaller major GHG emitters likely passes 
these tests. 
Furthermore, the EPA has some flexibility when determining 
BACT.  When the EPA determines BACT, it generates a list of 
categories of stationary sources that “cause, or contribute 
significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be 
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”203  The EPA 
then establishes federal “standards of performance” for new 
sources within each category, and can distinguish between 
different “classes, types, and sizes” within each category in 
establishing such standards.204  A “standard of performance” is 
defined as 
a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the 
degree of emission limitation achievable through the application 
of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into 
account the cost of achieving such reduction and any nonair 
quality health and environmental impact and energy 
requirements) the [EPA] determines has been adequately 
demonstrated.205 
 
 201. Id. at 1068. 
 202. Ala. Power Co., 636 F.2d at 360. 
 203. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
 204. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B). 
 205. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1). 
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The EPA can issue a design, equipment, work practice, or 
operation standard if “it is not feasible to prescribe or enforce a 
standard of performance.”206  This covers any situation where: 
(A) a pollutant or pollutants cannot be emitted through a 
conveyance designed and constructed to emit or capture such 
pollutant, or that any requirement for, or use of, such a 
conveyance would be inconsistent with any Federal, State, or 
local law, or (B) the application of measurement methodology to a 
particular class of sources is not practicable due to technological 
or economic limitations.207 
The definition of BACT, especially the phrase “emitted from 
or results from any major emitting facility,” is probably capacious 
enough to include building codes. 208  This strongly suggests that 
even if a building was all-electric and the power plant, not the 
building, emitted GHGs, the GHGs emissions could be seen as 
resulting from the building. 
Furthermore, not allowing the use of building codes to 
regulate GHG emissions from buildings would be an absurd 
result.  Not allowing the use of building codes could, and probably 
would, lead to absurdities like regulation of natural gas boilers 
but no similar regulation of electric heaters because electric 
heaters themselves do not emit GHGs and  natural gas heaters 
do.  This could encourage builders to build using electric heat, 
even when natural gas would be most appropriate on air pollution 
and energy efficiency grounds. 
The use of building codes to regulate GHG emissions is in 
some ways analogous to regulating lead in public drinking water 
systems in American Water Works Ass’n.209  In American Water 
Works Ass’n, the D.C. Circuit stated that “where a literal reading 
of a statutory term would lead to absurd results, the term simply 
‘has no meaning . . . and is the proper subject of construction by 
the EPA and the courts.’”210  In American Water Works Ass’n, the 
EPA regulated lead by corrosion controls and not by an MCL set 
 
 206. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(h)(1). 
 207. 42 U.S.C. 7411(h)(2). 
 208. 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006). 
 209. Am. Water Works Ass’n v. EPA, 40 F.3d 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 210. Id. at 1271. 
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at the tap because lead contamination of drinking water comes 
from old pipes (usually in private homes beyond the jurisdiction 
of the EPA) carrying the water, not from the water source.211  
Therefore, it is almost impossible to determine the level of lead in 
a public water system; it varies depending on where the water is 
drawn and the temperature of the water.212  Building codes would 
be a way to regulate GHG emissions from buildings that would 
both regulate actual emissions, as well as reduce energy needed 
inside of buildings. 
b. Outline of a Building Code Approach to Regulating 
GHG Emissions from Buildings 
A building code approach to regulating GHG emissions from 
buildings would have to cover both new and existing buildings.  
The approach is clearer for new (or extensively rebuilt) buildings, 
but the EPA has options for regulating existing buildings as well. 
The CAA gives the EPA and permitting authorities the 
authority to write general permits for existing sources.  These 
general permits would be difficult to enforce due to how many 
would need to be issued, but the EPA would likely be within the 
letter of the law.  These general permits would enforce more 
energy efficient building codes for existing buildings and be 
enforced by each state as part of a document like a State 
Implementation Plan (SIP).213  If a state refused to enact and 
enforce more energy efficient building codes for existing 
buildings, the federal government could enforce something like a 
Federal Implementation Plan (FIP). 
 
 211. Drinking Water Regulations; Maximum Contaminant Level Goals and 
National Primary Drinking Water Regulations for Lead and Copper, 53 Fed. 
Reg. 31,516, 31,526-27 (proposed Aug. 18, 1988) (noting that lead contamination 
of drinking water is rarely from the source of the water); Maximum 
Contaminant Level Goals and National Primary Drinking Water Regulations for 
Lead and Copper, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,460, 26,473-76 (final June 7, 1991) (noting 
that lead contamination of drinking water comes from pipes, often in people’s 
homes). 
 212. See Am. Water Works Ass’n, 40 F.3d at 1269. 
 213. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2006). 
37
  
2012] USING BUILDING CODES 95 
 
Unfortunately, most U.S. building codes for existing 
buildings do not have provisions for energy efficiency.214  
Therefore, there is not a clear U.S.-based model for such building 
codes. 
However, the European Union (EU) has issued a directive to 
improve energy efficiency of all buildings.215  In the EU, 
directives are issues by the European Union, and each member 
state (country) of the EU has to pass legislation or regulations to 
enforce EU directives.216  The EU’s Directive on the Energy 
Performance of Buildings requires member states to write and 
enforce energy efficiency building codes for both new and existing 
buildings.217  New buildings, rented buildings, and public 
buildings will need to have an “energy performance certificate” 
which details the relative energy efficiency of every building.218 
There is no single approach to regulating energy efficiency in 
existing buildings.  The current approach in Europe mandates 
high-energy efficiency standards for renovations and energy 
performance certificates for rented buildings.  Some states in the 
United States have programs where extra taxes on energy bills 
are used to retrofit existing buildings.219  Some combination of 
these methods of increasing energy efficiency could be mandated 
in the equivalent of SIPs.220 
Building codes cover all new buildings, not just buildings 
whose GHG emissions would be covered by the CAA.221  To 
convert these codes into regulation of new buildings, the EPA 
would likely use general permits and pBACT to regulate smaller 
major sources of GHGs.  BACT is set in a five step process: (1) 
identify all available control technologies; (2) eliminate 
 
 214. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, BUILDING ENERGY CODES 101: AN 
INTRODUCTION 5 (2010) [hereinafter BUILDING ENERGY CODES]. 
 215. Council Directive 2010/31, 2010 O.J. (L 153) 13 (EU). 
 216. See Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union art. 194(2), Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 135 [hereinafter 
TFEU]. 
 217. Council Directive 2010/31, art. 4, 2010 O.J. (L 153) 13, 19 (EU). 
 218. Id. art. 12. 
 219. See Energy Programs, CONN. ENERGY EFFICIENCY FUND, http://ctsaves 
energy.org/programs/index.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
 220. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (2006). 
 221. BUILDING ENERGY CODES, supra note 214, at 5. 
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technically infeasible options; (3) evaluate and rank the 
remaining technologies based on environmental effectiveness; (4) 
evaluate the cost-effectiveness of controls after considering 
energy and other environmental impacts; and (5) select BACT. 222  
Presumptive BACT would be set the same way, but not case-by-
case as is prescribed by the CAA.223  Instead, the EPA would have 
to issue general permits because of the very large number of 
permits required.  The EPA issues many general permits under 
the CWA, it stands to reason that this type of administration 
could be adopted for the CAA.224  The result of the pBACT and 
general permit process would be minimum requirements for state 
and local building codes as part of each state’s SIP, and a FIP if a 
state does not adopt a SIP with more energy efficient building 
codes.225  States would be allowed to have more energy efficient 
building codes, but would be forced to have building codes that 
were at least as efficient as the standard code developed through 
pBACT. 
The EPA would then effectuate a two-tiered system for 
issuing GHG permits.  The first tier would include all of those 
sources now regulated under the Tailoring Rule.  The permit 
process for those stationary sources would be unchanged from the 
current process, and would regulate few sources. 
The second tier would include smaller sources not currently 
included under the Tailoring Rule, but subject to regulation 
under the 100/250 tpy threshold.  All of these emitters would be 
regulated with general permits.  These permits would include 
building codes, which include requirements for energy efficiency 
of heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) systems, as 
well as insulation and design requirements.226 
The possible use of building codes to regulate GHG emissions 
suggests that the EPA has greatly overstated the administrative 
burdens of having smaller emitters comply with the plain 
language of the CAA.  Buildings that emit below the thresholds 
contemplated by the Tailoring Rule could all be required to have 
 
 222. NEW SOURCE REVIEW WORKSHOP MANUAL, supra note 180, at B.6. 
 223. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006). 
 224. See discussion supra Part IV.b. 
 225. See 42 U.S.C. § 7411. 
 226. See BUILDING ENERGY CODES, supra note 214, at 5. 
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general permits.  This could be done in a fashion that does not 
increase the administrative burden on most states and localities 
because most state and local governments already have energy 
efficiency standards as part of their building codes.227  In general, 
new buildings and major renovations require building permits, 
and those permits have energy efficiency requirements.228  
Furthermore, most CAA enforcement is already at the state 
level.229  A general permit could be nothing more than an 
additional page on an electronic building permit that can be sent 
to state environmental agencies and the federal EPA, noting that 
a building is being built or rebuilt to federal energy standards 
with federally approved appliances.  The federal EPA would not 
have to approve the permits, and state agencies would not have to 
approve additional permits. 
c. Selecting a Building Code 
The use of building codes requires (1) selecting or writing an 
energy efficient building code and (2) selecting codes for new and 
existing buildings.  Current building codes cover new buildings 
and major modifications.  New buildings emitting more than 
100/250 tpy CO2e would be subject to national building energy 
efficiency standards through EPA approval of SIPs.  States could 
also develop plans under their SIPs to encourage owners of 
existing buildings to weatherize their buildings and increase 
energy efficiency subject to another type of building code.  The 
EPA, other organizations, and agencies (especially the 
Department of Energy) would likely collaborate and develop an 
energy efficiency code for existing buildings. 
This collaboration is analogous to regulation of GHG 
emissions from cars and trucks (mobile sources).  In regulating 
mobile sources for GHG emissions, the EPA partnered with the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) to develop higher mileage 
 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See Clean Air Act Permitting for Greenhouse Gases, EPA, http://www.epa. 
gov/nsr/ghgpermitting.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2012). 
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standards for mobile sources.230  The EPA would probably do the 
same and work with DOE to develop minimum standards for 
large buildings.  Most of the work is already completed, so EPA 
could just borrow that work to promulgate new national 
minimum standards for large buildings. 
Selecting a building code would rely, at least in part, on 
EPA’s current five step process for BACT: (1) identify all 
available control technologies; (2) eliminate technically infeasible 
options; (3) evaluate and rank the remaining technologies based 
on environmental effectiveness; (4) evaluate the cost-effectiveness 
of controls after considering energy and other environmental 
impacts; and (5) select BACT.231 
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has a Building 
Energy Codes Program (BECP) to develop more energy efficient 
building codes.232  The BECP works with the International Code 
Council (ICC), the American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, 
and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE), the Illuminating 
Engineering Society of North America (IESNA), American 
Institute of Architects (AIA), the building industry, and state and 
local officials to develop and promote more stringent and easy-to-
understand building energy codes and to assess potential code 
barriers to new energy efficient technologies.233 
DOE’s work on building energy codes was established by the 
Energy Conservation and Production Act of 1976 (ECPA).234  
ECPA established requirements for the development and 
implementation of performance standards for all new residential 
and commercial buildings.235  BECP was funded in 1993 in 
response to the Energy Policy Act of 1992, which mandated that 
DOE participate in the model national codes development process 
 
 230. See JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 40506, CARS, TRUCKS, 
AND CLIMATE: EPA REGULATION OF GREENHOUSE GASES FROM MOBILE SOURCES 17 
(2010), available at http://crs.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/10Oct/R40506.pdf. 
 231. See 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (2006). 
 232. About Building Energy Codes, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, http://www.energy 
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and that DOE help states adopt and implement progressive 
energy codes.236  DOE does energy and cost analysis throughout 
the code change proposal process, which fits with the cost-
efficiency requirements of BACT. 
EPA and DOE would have to partner to determine or develop 
a building code for new and existing buildings that conforms to 
BACT.  This could be a multiyear process; so for the present, EPA 
should require that states adopt and enforce the most recent 
International Energy Conservation Code, released in 2012.237  A 
similar process would be necessary for developing energy 
efficiency codes for existing buildings. 
In setting energy efficiency codes for existing buildings, the 
United States should look to other countries’ energy efficiency 
programs.  There has been only limited development toward 
widespread, mandatory requirements for existing buildings.238  In 
general, countries have increased energy efficiency requirements 
for new buildings, and used information (Energy Performance 
Certificates) and fiscal incentives to improve energy efficiency in 
existing buildings. 239 
The two primary baseline building energy efficiency codes are 
the International Energy Conservation Code (IECC) and the 
ANSI/ASHRAE/IESNA Standard 90.1 Energy Standard for 
Buildings Except Low-Rise Residential Buildings.240  The “IECC 
addresses all residential and commercial buildings. ASHRAE 
90.1 covers commercial buildings, defined as buildings other than 
single-family dwellings and multi-family buildings three stories 
or less above grade.”241  The IECC adopted, by reference, 
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ASHRAE 90.1–“compliance with ASHRAE 90.1 qualifies as 
compliance with IECC for commercial buildings.”242 
The “IECC is developed under the auspices of the ICC using 
a government consensus process. Per this process, all interested 
parties may participate, but the final vote . . . is made by 
individuals associated with federal, state, and local governments 
who are also members of the ICC.”243  ICC codes are updated 
every three years; the most recent was released in 2012.  Since 
“the IECC is written in mandatory, enforceable language, state 
and local jurisdictions can easily adopt, implement, and enforce 
the IECC as their energy code.”244 
States vary greatly in their adoption of IECC building codes, 
but most states have at least some adoption of such codes, 
making it a good candidate for adoption nationwide.  Currently, 
39 states have standards that are at or above the 2009 
standards.245  However, most states only adopted these standards 
at the urge of the federal government.  In 2009, the Department 
of Energy stipulated that any state receiving funding from the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act’s State Energy 
Program had to meet the 2009 IECC and ASHRAE standards.246  
This was effective as a majority of states updated their codes; in 
2008, only 18% of states had updated their residential codes and 
12% had implemented or upgraded their commercial codes.247  
This suggests that most states will not update their energy 
efficiency codes unless the federal government gives them an 
incentive to do so. 
California is an important exception because it has long had 
by far the strictest energy efficiency requirements.  In 1978, 
California adopted Title 24, “a set of high-efficiency standards 
dictating energy-saving requirements for walls, roofs, windows, 
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insulation, heating, water heating, lighting, and ventilating and 
air conditioning systems.”248  “Along with mandates for energy-
efficient appliances, the Title 24 standards have saved 
Californians more than $56 billion in electrical and natural gas 
expenses” over the last thirty years, which greatly outweighs 
increases in buildings costs caused by more energy efficient 
codes.249  “Although per capita electricity use in the U.S. has 
increased by nearly 50% since the mid-1970s,” California’s per 
capita electricity use has remained almost constant.250 
The 2012 ASHRAE and ICC building energy codes have 
learned from California’s experience and are about 30% more 
efficient than the 2006 codes.251  This is by far the largest 
increase in efficiency in the history of the codes, and will actually 
be about 12% more efficient than California’s code.252  Among 
major changes to the code are “lighting that shuts off 
automatically in commercial buildings; minimum energy 
performance standards for heating systems in computer rooms; 
and more efficient water-cooled air conditioners.”253 
An application of BACT to buildings would require that 
states adopt codes at least as stringent as the 2012 ASHRAE and 
ICC building codes for buildings that emit more than the 100/250 
tpy threshold of CO2e.  Since DOE conducts cost-benefit analyses 
on building codes, such analyses can be made to conform to the 
BACT process. 
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V. USING BUILDING CODES TO REGULATE GHG 
EMISSIONS UNDER THE CAA IS GOOD POLICY 
Buildings consume 70% of the electricity in the United 
States, and result in 39% of total carbon dioxide emissions.254  
Building emissions in the United States are 8% of the world’s 
total emissions.255  The Department of Energy has released a 
report entitled Building Energy Codes 101: An Introduction that 
discusses these issues at length.256  Building Codes 101 discusses: 
(1) “[b]enefits in terms of the current energy, economic, and 
environmental challenges facing our world today;” (2) 
“[c]hallenges in terms of adoption, implementation, compliance, 
and enforcement;” (3) “[d]evelopment processes led by the 
International Code Council (ICC) and the American Society of 
Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-Conditioning Engineers 
(ASHRAE);” (4) “[a]doption and incorporation into building design 
and construction by states and jurisdictions;” and (5) 
“[e]nforcement at the state and local level.”257 
According to DOE, “[r]ecent research shows that if the 2006 
International Energy Conservation Code (IECC) and 
ANSI/ASHRAE/IESNA Standard 90.1-2004 were upgraded to be 
30 to 50 percent more stringent, adopted among states, and 
effectively implemented, significant benefits would be gained in 
terms of energy consumption, cost savings, and [carbon dioxide] 
emissions reduction.”258  Note again that the 2012 IECC is 30% 
more energy efficient than the 2006 IECC.259  By 2030, the effects 
of improved residential and commercial building codes would 
reduce building energy use by 3.5 quadrillion Btu.260  This is 
equivalent to power generated by 260 medium-sized (450-MW) 
power plants.261  By 2030, total annual savings to building 
owners would be $30 billion.262  “Even accounting for the 
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increased investment cost of the measures, the net benefits to the 
nation are large.”263  “Transforming the building sector to employ 
more energy-efficient designs, equipment, and solar power could 
cut projected overall household energy expenses in 2030 from 
$285 billion to $130 billion.”264  Failing to transform the building 
sector “will raise the cost of meeting long-term climate goals by at 
least $500 billion per year,” as more expensive means would have 
to be used to reduce carbon emissions.265 
Others have found that the United States economy provides 
tremendous opportunities for net present value (NPV) positive 
increases in energy efficiency.266  In 2009, McKinsey found that 
an investment of $520 billion in energy efficiency would unlock 
energy efficiency gains of $1.2 trillion, both in NPV terms.267 
In its report, McKinsey found many barriers to investment in 
energy efficiency.  These barriers include: 
● Agency (incentives split between parties, impeding capture 
of potential), 
● Ownership transfer (owner expects to leave before payback 
time), 
● Transaction barriers (unquantifiable incidental costs of 
deployment), 
● Pricing distortions (by regulatory, tax, or others distortions); 
● Risk and uncertainty (about ability to capture benefit of the 
investment), 
● Lack of awareness/information (about product efficiency and 
own consumption behavior), 
● Custom and habit (practices that prevent capture of 
potential), 
● Elevated hurdle rate (similar options treated differently); 
● Adverse bundling (combining efficiency savings with costly 
options), 
● Capital constraints (inability to raise initial outlay), 
● Product availability (insufficient supply or channels to 
market), and 
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● Installation and use (improperly installed and/or 
operated).268 
All of these barriers to the proper realization of energy efficiency 
suggest that government intervention is needed.269  Agency and 
ownership transfer problems are especially severe.  Energy 
efficiency is difficult to measure, and therefore it is difficult to 
effectively capitalize the value of it into rent or property values.  
For a rented property, a landlord has little market incentive to 
increase energy efficiency in his rented property because he 
cannot gain the full value of increased rent from his investment.  
Property owner-occupiers will be reluctant to invest in energy 
efficiency because they may not be around to gain the full benefits 
of the investment, and they will likely not receive the full value of 
the investment into energy efficiency when they sell the property. 
Government intervention solves these problems because all 
building owners are forced to invest in energy efficiency.  
Everyone then pays for less energy, and there is less 
environmental degradation.  Adopting stricter building and 
appliance codes would save money, not including the 
environmental benefits from reducing pollution from mining and 
burning fossil fuels (which provide most of our energy).  The 
national implementation of stricter building and appliance codes 
would be cost-effective if climate change did not exist.  The 
existence of climate change makes the national implementation of 
stricter building and appliance codes even more pressing. 
Regulating building codes under the CAA would also solve 
major problems with building code implementation.  Currently, 
adoption of stricter building codes as they are developed is not 
automatic in most states.270  Requirement of BACT for larger 
buildings would make this automatic, as the new building codes 
would be considered part of SIPs that must be enforced by the 
state.  Furthermore, since all jurisdictions would have high 
energy efficiency standards for large buildings, most builders 
would be able to deliver high energy efficiency standards.  There 
would still be the challenges of implementation, compliance, and 
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enforcement, but these problems currently exist and would not 
likely be exacerbated by stricter building codes. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
In 2009, the EPA found that GHGs endanger public health 
and welfare, responding to Mass v. EPA (2007).  The EPA started 
regulating GHGs by regulating mobile sources, and then moved 
to regulate stationary sources. 
Regulation of GHGs under the CAA is difficult; the CAA was 
certainly not written with GHGs in mind.  Most air pollutants are 
emitted in such small quantities that only very large sources (like 
power plants and large industrial facilities) require permits.  In 
contrast, carbon dioxide is emitted in such large quantities that 
most commercial, industrial, and large multifamily residential 
buildings emit more than 100/250 tpy and require permits under 
the plain language of the CAA.  Instead of hundreds of permits 
per year, EPA would have to issue millions of permits. 
The plain language of the CAA states that the EPA must 
regulate sources emitting more than 100/250 tpy of any regulated 
air pollutant.  However, permits require BACT, which is 
supposed to be determined on a case-by-case basis.  The EPA 
cannot regulate millions of sources on a case-by-case basis.  In the 
Tailoring Rule, the EPA chose to limit GHG regulation to sources 
emitting more than 75,000/100,000 tpy CO2e.   
The EPA justified the Tailoring Rule’s departure from the 
plain language of the CAA with three doctrines: (1) absurd 
results, (2) administrative necessity, and (3) one-step-at-a-time.  
None of these three doctrines adequately justify the Tailoring 
Rule, and therefore it will likely be overturned based on Chevron 
if the D.C. Circuit reaches the merits of the case. 
The best way to regulate smaller major sources for GHG 
emissions is by using building codes.  Precedent and the language 
of the CAA suggest that forcing states to adopt and enforce more 
energy efficient building codes through their SIPs to reduce GHG 
emissions would be a permissible reading of the CAA. 
While regulating smaller major sources provides some 
difficulties (like how to regulate existing buildings), forcing 
building owners to increase the energy efficiency of new and 
existing buildings is cost-effective, even disregarding positive 
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effects on the environment.  Market failures prevent the full 
realization of energy efficiency.  Federal government 
intervention, as required by the CAA, could appropriately 
incentivize state and local governments to include high levels of 
energy efficiency in their building codes. 
The Tailoring Rule is unlawful and thwarts national progress 
in energy efficiency.  It should be replaced, and we should 
embrace the challenge of using the CAA and more energy efficient 
building codes to regulate GHGs and move towards a cleaner, 
greener future. 
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